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Map of the world with the in 1917. Allies are in green, the Central Powers in orange and neutral countries in grey. The causes of World War I remain controversial and debated questions. Began in the in late July 1914 and, leaving. Scholars looking at the long-term seek to explain why two rival sets of powers – Germany and Austria-Hungary on the one hand, and Russia, France, and Great Britain on the other – had come into conflict by 1914. They look at such factors as political, territorial and economic conflicts,, a complex web of alliances and alignments,, the growth of, and the power vacuum created by the. Other important long-term or structural factors that are often studied include unresolved, the perceived breakdown of the in Europe, convoluted and fragmented, the of the previous decades, and.

Scholars doing short-term analysis focused on summer 1914 ask if the conflict could have been stopped, or whether it was out of control. The immediate causes lay in decisions made by statesmen and generals during the. This crisis was triggered by the by an ethnic who had been supported by a nationalist organization in. The crisis escalated as the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia came to involve Russia, Germany, France, and ultimately Belgium and Great Britain.

Other factors that came into play during the diplomatic crisis that preceded the war included misperceptions of intent (e.g., the German belief that Britain would remain neutral), fatalism that war was inevitable, and the speed of the crisis, which was exacerbated by delays and misunderstandings in diplomatic communications. The crisis followed a series of diplomatic clashes among the (,,,, and ) over European and in the decades before 1914 that had left tensions high. In turn these public clashes can be traced to changes in the balance of power in Europe since 1867.

Consensus on the origins of the war remains elusive since historians disagree on key factors, and place differing emphasis on a variety of factors. This is compounded by changing, particularly the delayed availability of classified historical archives. The deepest distinction among historians is between those who focus on the actions of Germany and Austria-Hungary as key and those who focus on a wider group of actors. Secondary fault lines exist between those who believe that Germany deliberately planned a European war, those who believe that the war was ultimately unplanned but still caused principally by Germany and Austria-Hungary taking risks, and those who believe that either all or some of the other powers, namely Russia, France, Serbia and Great Britain, played a more significant role in causing the war than has been traditionally suggested. Contents • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Polarization of Europe, 1887–1914 To understand the long term origins of the war in 1914 it is essential to understand how the powers formed into two competing sets sharing common aims and enemies.

These two sets became, by August 1914, Germany and Austria-Hungary on the one hand and Russia, France, Serbia and Great Britain on the other. German re-alignment to Austria-Hungary and Russian re-alignment to France, 1887–1892 In 1887 German and Russian alignment was secured by means of a secret arranged. However, in 1890 the treaty was allowed to lapse in favor of the between Germany and Austria-Hungary. In response Russia secured the in 1892, which was to last until 1917.

French revanchist foreign policy towards Germany. 'The Chain of Friendship', an American editorial cartoon from depicting the supposed web of alliances, captioned, 'If Austria attacks Serbia, Russia will fall upon Austria, Germany upon Russia, and France and England upon Germany.' This dimension developed into the concept of. General narratives of the war tend to emphasis the importance of Alliances in binding the major powers to act in the event of a crisis such as the July crisis. Historians such as Margaret MacMillan warn against the argument that alliances forced the great powers to act as they did during the July crisis. MacMillan states: 'What we tend to think of as fixed alliances before the First World War were nothing of the sort. They were much more loose, much more porous, much more capable of change.'

The most important in Europe required participants to agree to collective defense if attacked. Some of these represented formal alliances while the Triple Entente represented only a frame of mind. These included: • (1879) or • The (1894) • The addition of Italy to the Germany and Austrian alliance in 1882, forming the 'Triple Alliance'. •, guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium There are three notable exceptions which demonstrate that alliances did not in themselves force the great powers to act: • The ' between Britain and France in 1905 included a secret agreement which left the northern coast of France and the Channel to be defended by the British navy only, and the separate ' between Britain and Russia (1907) that formed the so-called.

However, the Triple Entente between Russia, France and the United Kingdom did not in fact force the United Kingdom to mobilize because it was not a military treaty. • Moreover, general narratives of the war regularly misstate that Russia was allied to Serbia. Noted: 'Russia had no treaty of alliance with Serbia and was under no obligation to support it diplomatically, let alone go to its defence'. • Italy, despite being part of the did not enter the war in defence of its alliance partners Arms race By the 1870s or 1880s all the major powers were preparing for a large-scale war, although none expected one. Britain focused on building up its Royal Navy, already stronger than the next two navies combined. Germany, France, Austria, Italy and Russia, and some smaller countries, set up conscription systems whereby young men would serve from 1 to three years in the army, then spend the next 20 years or so in the reserves with annual summer training.

Men from higher social statuses became officers. Each country devised a mobilisation system whereby the reserves could be called up quickly and sent to key points by rail. Every year the plans were updated and expanded in terms of complexity.

Each country stockpiled arms and supplies for an army that ran into the millions. Germany in 1874 had a regular professional army of 420,000 with an additional 1.3 million reserves. By 1897 the regular army was 545,000 strong and the reserves 3.4 million. The French in 1897 had 3.4 million reservists, Austria 2.6 million, and Russia 4.0 million. The various national war plans had been perfected by 1914, albeit with Russia and Austria trailing in effectiveness. Recent wars (since 1865) had typically been short—a matter of months. All the war plans called for a decisive opening and assumed victory would come after a short war; no one planned for or was ready for the food and munitions needs of a long stalemate as actually happened in 1914–18.

As has put it, 'A self-reinforcing cycle of heightened military preparedness. Was an essential element in the conjuncture that led to disaster. The armaments race.

Was a necessary precondition for the outbreak of hostilities.' David Herrmann goes further, arguing that the fear that 'windows of opportunity for victorious wars' were closing, 'the arms race did precipitate the First World War.' If Archduke Franz Ferdinand had been assassinated in 1904 or even in 1911, Herrmann speculates, there might have been no war. It was '. the armaments race. And the speculation about imminent or preventive wars' that made his death in 1914 the trigger for war. One of the aims of the of 1899, held at the suggestion of Tsar Nicholas II, was to discuss disarmament.

The was held in 1907. All the signatories except for Germany supported disarmament. Germany also did not want to agree to binding arbitration and mediation. The Kaiser was concerned that the United States would propose disarmament measures, which he opposed.

All parties tried to revise international law to their own advantage. Anglo-German naval race. 1909 cartoon in Puck shows (clockwise) US, Germany, Britain, France and Japan engaged in naval race in a 'no limit' game. Historians have debated the role of the German naval build-up as the principal cause of deteriorating Anglo-German relations.

In any case Germany never came close to catching up with Britain. Supported by 's enthusiasm for an expanded German navy, Grand Admiral championed four from 1898 to 1912, and, from 1902 to 1910, the embarked on its own massive expansion to keep ahead of the Germans. This competition came to focus on the revolutionary new ships based on the, which was launched in 1906, and which gave Britain a battleship that far outclassed any other in Europe. The naval strength of the powers in 1914 Country Personnel Large Naval Vessels () Tonnage Russia 54,000 4 328,000 France 68,000 10 731,000 Britain 209,000 29 2,205,000 TOTAL 331,000 43 3,264,000 Germany 79,000 17 1,019,000 Austria-Hungary 16,000 4 249,000 TOTAL 95,000 21 1,268,000 (Source: ) The overwhelming British response proved to Germany that its efforts were unlikely to equal the.

In 1900, the British had a 3.7:1 tonnage advantage over Germany; in 1910 the ratio was 2.3:1 and in 1914, 2.1:1. Ferguson argues that, 'So decisive was the British victory in the naval arms race that it is hard to regard it as in any meaningful sense a cause of the First World War.'

This ignores the fact that the had narrowed the gap by nearly half, and that the Royal Navy had long intended to be stronger than any two potential opponents; the was in a period of growth, making the German gains very ominous. Zee Telugu Mangatayaru Serial Mom more. In Britain in 1913, there was intense internal debate about new ships due to the growing influence of ideas and increasing financial constraints.

In early-mid-1914 Germany adopted a policy of building submarines instead of new dreadnoughts and destroyers, effectively abandoning the race, but kept this new policy secret to delay other powers following suit. The Germans abandoned the naval race before the war broke out.

The extent to which the naval race was one of the chief factors in Britain's decision to join the remains a key controversy. Historians such as believe it was not significant, with Margaret Moran taking the opposite view. Russian interests in Balkans and Ottoman Empire The main Russian goals included strengthening its role as the protector of Eastern Christians in the Balkans (such as the Serbians). Although Russia enjoyed a booming economy, growing population, and large armed forces, its strategic position was threatened by an expanding Turkish military trained by German experts using the latest technology.

The start of the war renewed attention of old goals: expelling the Turks from Constantinople, extending Russian dominion into eastern Anatolia and Persian Azerbaijan, and annexing Galicia. These conquests would assure Russian predominance in the Black Sea and access to the Mediterranean.

Technical and military factors The 'Short war illusion' Traditional narratives of the war suggested that when the war began both sides believed that the war would end quickly. Rhetorically speaking there was an expectation that the war would be “Over by Christmas” 1914. This is important for the origins of the conflict since it suggests that, given the expectation was that war would be short, the statesmen did not tend to take gravity of military action as seriously as they might have done. However, modern historiography suggests a more nuanced approach. There is ample evidence to suggest that statesmen and military leaders thought the war would be lengthy, terrible and have profound political consequences.

While it is true all military leaders planned for a swift victory, many military and civilian leaders recognized that the war may be long and highly destructive. The principal German and French military leaders, including Moltke and Ludendorff and his French counterpart Joseph Joffre, expected a long war. The British Secretary of State for War expected a long war: 'three years' or longer, he told an amazed colleague. Moltke hoped that a European war, if it broke out, would be resolved swiftly, but he also conceded that it might drag on for years, wreaking immeasurable ruin. Asquith wrote of the approach of ‘Armageddon’ and French and Russian generals spoke of a ‘war of extermination’ and the ‘end of civilization’.

Foreign Secretary Grey famously stated just hours before Britain declared war: 'The lamps are going out all over Europe, we shall not see them lit again in our life-time”. Nevertheless, Clark concludes that 'In the minds of many statesmen, the hope for a short war and the fear of a long one seemed to have cancelled each other out, holding at bay a fuller appreciation of the risks.' Primacy of the offensive and war by timetable. See also: Military commanders of the time, including Moltke, Joffre and Conrad, held that seizing the offensive was extremely important. This theory encouraged all belligerents to devise war plans to strike first to gain the advantage.

These war plans all included complex plans for mobilisation of the armed forces, either as a prelude to war or as a deterrent. In the case of the continental Great Powers the mobilisation plans included arming and transporting millions of men and their equipment, typically by rail and to strict schedules- hence the metaphor 'War by Timetable'. These mobilisation plans shortened the window for diplomacy as military planners wanted to begin mobilization as quickly as possible to avoid being caught on the defensive. They also put pressure on policymakers to begin their own mobilisation once it was discovered that other nations had begun to mobilise.

Some historians assert that mobilization schedules were so rigid that once it was begun, they could not be cancelled without massive disruption of the country and military disorganization and so diplomatic overtures conducted after the mobilizations had begun were ignored. For example, Russia ordered partial mobilisation on 25 July. The policy was intended to be a mobilisation against Austria-Hungary only. However, due to a lack of pre-war planning for this type of partial mobilisation, the Russians realised by 29 July that partial mobilisation was not militarily possible, and as it would interfere with a general mobilisation, only full mobilisation could prevent the entire operation being botched. The Russians were therefore faced with only two options, to cancel mobilisation during a crisis or to move to full mobilisation, which they did on 30 July.

This full mobilisation meant mobilising along both the Russian border with Austro-Hungary and the border with Germany. For their part the German war plans, the so-called Schlieffen plan, assumed a two-front war against France and Russia. They were predicated on massing the bulk of the German army against France, and taking the offensive in the West, while a holding force held East Prussia. The plans were based on the assumption that France would mobilise significantly quicker than Russia.

Hence German forces could be deployed in the West to defeat France before turning to face the slow-moving Russians in the East. On 28 July, Germany learned through its spy network that Russia had implemented partial mobilisation and its 'Period Preparatory to War'. The Germans assumed that Russia had, after all, decided upon war and that her mobilisation put Germany in danger. This was doubly so because German war plans, the so-called Schlieffen Plan, relied upon Germany to mobilise speedily enough to defeat France first (by attacking largely through neutral Belgium) before turning to defeat the slower-moving Russians. Christopher Clarke states: 'German efforts at mediation – which suggested that Austria should “Halt in Belgrade” and use the occupation of the Serbian capital to ensure its terms were met – were rendered futile by the speed of Russian preparations, which threatened to force the Germans to take counter–measures before mediation could begin to take effect'.. Furthermore, Clarke states: 'The Germans declared war on Russia before the Russians declared war on Germany.

But by the time that happened, the Russian government had been moving troops and equipment to the German front for a week. The Russians were the first great power to issue an order of general mobilisation and the first Russo-German clash took place on German, not on Russian soil, following the Russian invasion of East Prussia. That doesn’t mean that the Russians should be ‘blamed’ for the outbreak of war. Rather it alerts us to the complexity of the events that brought war about and the limitations of any thesis that focuses on the culpability of one actor.' Translated by Massey, Isabella M. Oxford University Press..

Basic Books.. • Fromkin, David (2004).. (April 2014). 'Absolute Numbers: The Schlieffen Plan as a Critique of German Strategy in 1914'.. 21 (2): 193–213... • Jastrow, Morris (1917).. Lippincott Company.

Humanity Books.. • Mulligan, William (2014)... 129 (538): 639–666.. • Ponting, Clive (2002).. Chatto & Windus.. Martin's Press..

• Zuber, Terence (2011).. History Press..

Further reading. • Collins, Ross F. World War I: Primary Documents on Events from 1914 to 1919 (2007) • Dugdale, E.T.S. German Diplomatic Documents 1871-1914 (4 vol 1928-31), in English translation. • French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The French Yellow Book: Diplomatic Documents (1914) • Gooch, G. Recent Revelations of European Diplomacy (1940); 475pp detailed summaries of memoirs from all the major belligerents • Gooch, G.P. And Harold Temperley, eds.

British documents on the origins of the war, 1898-1914 (11 vol. I The end of British isolation—v.2. From the occupation of Kiao-Chau to the making of the Anglo-French entente Dec. The testing of the Entente, 1904-6 -- v.4. The Anglo-Russian rapprochment, 1903-7 -- v.5. The Near East, 1903-9 -- v.6. Anglo-German tension.

Armaments and negotiation, 1907-12—v.7. The Agadir crisis—v.8. Arbitration, neutrality and security—v.9. The Balkan wars, pt.1-2 -- v.10,pt.1. The Near and Middle East on the eve of war. The last years of peace—v.11.

The outbreak of war V.3. The testing of the Entente, 1904-6 -- v.4.

The Anglo-Russian rapprochment, 1903-7 -- v.5. The Near East, 1903-9 -- v.6. Anglo-German tension.

Armaments and negotiation, 1907-12—v. The Mystical And Magical System Of The Aa Pdf. 7. The Agadir crisis—v.8.

Arbitration, neutrality and security—v.9. The Balkan wars, pt.1-2 -- v.10,pt.1. The Near and Middle East on the eve of war. The last years of peace—v.11. The outbreak of war. And Harold Temperley, eds.

British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914 Volume XI, the Outbreak of War Foreign Office Documents (1926) • Lowe, C.J. Dockrill, eds.

The Mirage of Power: The Documents of British Foreign Policy 1914-22 (vol 3, 1972), pp 423–759 • Mombauer, Annika. The Origins of the First World War: Diplomatic and Military Documents (2013), 592pp; • Reichstag speeches External links Wikimedia Commons has media related to. • • by •: An article by Dr.

Gary Sheffield at the BBC History site. •: Timeline of events and origins of WWI • • by • • (on the domestic causes of war).